

Fund Performance

The Pelargos Japan Alpha Fund Class B appreciated +0.88% in November. Since July 2008, inception-to-date (ITD), the fund is up +54.98% with a realized volatility of 7.3%, whilst the MSCI Japan is up +8.22% ITD with a realized volatility of 20.1%.

| Fund Performar | ice | | | |
|----------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|
| Share Class | NAV | MTD | YTD | ITD |
| Class A EUR | 1,355.18 | 0.99% | 1.40% | 35.52% |
| Class B EUR | 1,549.79 | 0.88% | 1.68% | 54.98% |

Market Environment

Global capital markets were all about macro events in November given President-elect Trump's victory early in the month. The MSCI Japan ended the month up 5.8%, but was down almost as much in the immediate aftermath of the election result.

Again, Japan was the most liquid global market open when the result hit the wires, and the "shock" of a Trump victory was taken negatively, with the Topix selling off -4.6% and yen/US\$ strengthening to 102.6/\$ by the Tokyo close. Pelargos has a clear, predetermined policy for dealing with sudden periods of extreme volatility. Given the potential significance of the election we were watching the events unfold live and were able to de-risk the portfolio as a Trump victory became clear. Of course, while the initial shock was taken negatively in Asia, European and US markets concluded that a Trump Presidency will be inflationary and positive for risk assets. We were therefore able to respond by quickly rebuilding our long exposure with relatively high beta stocks that allowed us to participate in the post-election rally.

Many of the investment themes of recent months, accelerated after the Trump victory, supporting our value-focused strategy. Cheap inflation proxies such financials and real estate continued to rally. The rotation into cheap cyclicals and business models benefitting from higher rates started in late June / early July and continued through November. Value stocks again performed well, and were joined by those with significant exposure to a weaker yen.

| Top 10 gross positior | 15 | | |
|-----------------------|------|--------------------|------|
| Nishimatsu Const | 3.1% | Sumco | 2.5% |
| Pola Orbis | 2.7% | Ryosan | 2.4% |
| NBF | 2.7% | Kose | 2.4% |
| Tokyo Ohka Kogyo | 2.6% | Toshiba Plant Sys. | 2.4% |
| Relia | 2.5% | Mitsui Soko | 2.4% |

Source: BNY Mellon Fund Services

Source: BNY Mellon Fund Services

| Single Stock Activity | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|------|-----------------------------|----|--|--|--|--|--|
| Largest Buy & Buy Co | ver* | Largest Sell & Short Sell** | | | | | | |
| Pola Orbis | В | Murata Mfg | S | | | | | |
| Nippon Gas | В | Honda Motor | S | | | | | |
| Kikkoman Corp | BC | Japan Tobacco | SS | | | | | |
| Shin-Etsu Chemical | В | Ichigo Group | S | | | | | |
| Nishimatsu Const | В | Oriental Land | SS | | | | | |

* B = Buy; BC = Buy Cover

** S = Sell; SS = Short Sell

Top & Bottom Industry Movers Industry Group ΡВ 19.1% 14.0 Insurance 14.6% 1.1 Banks 18.6% -6.5% 0.5 10.7 Div. Financials 13.8% 18.2 -6.1% 1 1 Industry Group **Household Products** -2.9% 29.9% 2.8 26.2 Food Beverage -1.8% 21.1% 1.5 20.6 -0.5% 19.2% 1.5 24.6 Pharma

Source: Bloomberg

| General Statistics | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| % Return long book | 4.5% |
| % Return short book | 3.4% |
| # Long stocks | 47 |
| # Short stocks | 13 |
| % Long stocks 个 | 83% |
| % Short stocks ↓ | 15% |
| # Up days / Down days | 13/9 |
| Daily Correlation with MSCI JP | 0.91 |
| Turnover as % NAV | 46% |
| | Source: Factset |

Investment Strategy

The core value book consists of 47 long positions and 13 short positions. Given the macro events in November, the fund saw more significant turnover than usual. Some of the largest positions of recent months were scaled back, with a refocus on being long cheap, value stock with relatively high beta, and short expensive defensives, particularly fixed income proxies which are being punished as global yields rise. In many cases, we have been able to express our views by expanding existing positions.

We again increased the short position in Kose, and we are still convinced Pola Orbis stock is a better proposition, because Pola Orbis' earnings power is more attractive. We added to the position in November.

We entered a new short position in Japan Tobacco after meeting with the company. The tobacco price hikes of recent years have been priced in to the stock and the company's promotion of ecigarettes will have a small, but negative impact on margins.



Investment Strategy

November's Top Gainers & Losers were heavily affected not only by the market's extreme volatility over the month, but also by our trading. We sharply reduced our exposure to yen-sensitive component maker Murata Manufacturing given the need to de-risk into the Trump volatility, and this resulted in a loss. But we quickly rebuilt long-exposure by adding to existing positions cheap, highbeta momentum stock such as Sumco, Sumitomo Metal Mining, Resona, and Mitsui Fudosan, all of which made a significant contribution to the month's performance. We added considerably to our long position in Nishimatsu Construction in November, and that also made a significant positive contribution.

The fundamentals for Tokyo Ohka have been strong for some time now and the stock performed strongly in in November as the market became increasingly optimistic about the outlook for semiconductor volumes.

As a factor, momentum worked negatively as well as positively in November. We have been successfully holding condo developer Takara Leben, and office redeveloper Ichigo Group for several years. However both stocks peaked recently compared to the market, after having avoided much of the market's weakness in 2H CY15 and 1H CY16. Profit taking in recent months continued in November. We continue to see significant long-term upside for both.







Style Performance

On a daily basis we track a number of style factors through our proprietary quant model. This helps us to detect dislocation within the market. In addition, it helps our understanding of style trends and investor's behavior in Japan.

The outperformance of the value factor which started last summer, continued in November, with momentum accelerating after the Trump win. The performance of value was very consistent across the different types of definitions and sectors. Most value factors are now showing strong momentum, and most expensive sectors are consistently underperforming cheap sectors. In previous newsletters we have commented extensively about the gross mispricing of cyclicals against defensives and the reversal of this misallocation is in full swing. It has also been joined by the strong outperformance of cheap cyclicals.

The P/E of the long book is 16.7x compared to 23.4x for the short book. The EV/EBITDA of the long book is 7.1x compared to 11.4x for the short book. The dividend yield of the long book is 2.2% compared to 1.6% in the short book.

The weighted average P/B of the long book is 1.5x compared to 2.2x for the short book. The cheapest P/B stocks can be found in the financials sector. However, because we restrict our investment universe to what we deem knowable and comprehendible we only follow a few banks and insurance companies.

Price momentum exposure has increased significantly. On a 9-month basis, the long book is up 22.6% and the short book up 1.7%.

| Top Gainers & Losers | | | | |
|----------------------|------|----------------|------|-------------|
| Gainers | CTR* | Losers | | CTR* |
| Sumco Corp L | 0.4% | Murata Mfg | L | -0.3% |
| Nishimatsu Const L | 0.4% | Takara Leben | L | -0.2% |
| Sumitomo Met Mi L | 0.3% | Nippon Express | S | -0.2% |
| Resona Holdings L | 0.3% | Ichigo Group | L | -0.2% |
| Mitsui Fudosan L | 0.2% | Honda Motor | L | -0.1% |
| *CTR = Contribution | | | Sour | ce: Factset |



Source: UBS PAS



Risk Measurement and Management

The chart below shows the rolling 12-month net and gross exposure for the fund. The exposures are shown as 10 (trading) days moving averages.

Little has changed in terms of net and gross exposure. At the end of October, the gross exposure stood at 128%, the delta adjusted gross exposure was also 128%. The net exposure stood at 25%.

The ex-ante volatility based on daily data was 7.5% with an ex-ante beta of 0.28. In stark contrast to prior years, the beta of the long book is higher than the short book. As explained above we favor long positions in cheap, cyclical stocks and short expensive defensives.



Source: BNY Mellon Fund Services*

| | Long | Short |
|------------------------|-------|-----------------|
| Price to Earnings (PE) | 16.7 | 23.4 |
| 0 () | 7.1 | 11.4 |
| EV/EBITDA | | |
| Price to Book (PB) | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| Dividend Yield | 2.2 | 1.6 |
| EV/IC | 0.9 | 2.0 |
| 1 month momentum | 6.3 | 0.8 |
| 6 month momentum | 13.9 | 0.0 |
| 9 month momentum | 22.6 | 1.7 |
| Earnings momentum (1M) | 14.2 | 10.0 |
| Earnings momentum (3M) | 4.5 | 8.0 |
| CFROI | 7.8% | 10.2% |
| Cash/MarketValue | 35.0% | 15.1% |
| | | Source: Factset |
| Style Exposure | | |
| | Long | Short |
| Beta | 0.94 | 0.70 |
| Volatility | 17.7% | 14.7% |
| Debt-to-equity | 12% | 45% |
| | | Source: UBS PAS |
| | | |

| Risk Statistics Delta Adjusted | |
|---|------|
| Volatility (ex-ante; 3 months daily data) | 7.5% |
| Volatility (ex-ante; 5yr monthly data) | 6.6% |
| Var (99%, 5 days) | 2.6% |
| Beta (ex-ante) | 0.28 |

Source: GS and Nomura

Outlook

Strategic Framework - Outlook 2nd half of 2016

During the first half of 2016 we operated under the assumption of a cyclical bear market. The three year bull run completed in August 2015. We argued for a cyclical bear market due to tightening conditions in global dollar liquidity. We correctly anticipated that the Fed would not be able to normalize interest rates as projected, because it is built on the faulty assumption of a self-sustaining US economic growth cycle. This thesis has materialized to a large extent and Japanese equities had the deepest correction since the global financial crisis, correcting 30% peak-to-through. In June, we witnessed a full fledged panic with Japanese equities in free fall and broad based capitulation. Our strategy is contrarian in nature, thus buying cheap assets and shorting overpriced assets. In July, dislocation within the market was at multi-decade highs and the potential alpha source an obvious one. During the summer months bond yields bottomed globally and one of the biggest style roation in decades started. However, Japanese equity price action remained tightly correlated to currency moves and swings in liquidity conditions. Only after appreciating the pro-cyclical nature of president-elect Trump's economic policies, markets are starting to price in more structural US dollar strength vs the Japanese yen. Therefore it seems that the turning point in Japanese equities coincided with the low point in value vs growth stocks in early July 2016. *Tactical assessment* - monthly outlook

We became more constructive on Japanese equities from a long beta perspective in October. Our expectation that "the best risk/reward opportunity lies in going long cheap cyclical assets and short expensive, defensive yield proxies, preferable stocks fitting the low-volatility theme" that we explained last month has proved accurate in November. As US rates move higher, the increased interest rate differential is mitigating the buying pressure on the JPY, and we are watching to see if JPY weakness accelerates as the market further appreciates BOJ's Kuroda commitment to keeping 10-year JGB rates at 0%. This could be the perfect storm for a rapid depreciation of the JPY against the US dollar and even the euro as ECB tappering becomes a possibility. Market participants are certainly not positioned for such an outcome. Higher Japanese equities would be inevitable. During 2016 we drastically increased the exposure towards low price-to-book specialty tech, tech chemicals and cheap capital goods companies. On the other side, the short book remains exposed to the expensive defensives. Now that the low-volatility theme and bond-like equity proxies have suffered heavy losses, it is only the beginning of the outflows to come and we remain convinced that value will continue to perform well.



| Historic Fund | l Performar | nce (Mont | :hly) | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|-------------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec |
| Class A EUR | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2016 | 1.35% | 0.88% | 1.08% | -0.20% | -1.03% | -4.52% | 2.08% | -1.09% | -0.33% | 2.38% | 0.99% | |
| 2015 | -1.28% | 4.85% | -0.32% | 3.21% | 2.54% | -1.63% | -3.07% | -3.05% | 2.42% | 1.83% | 2.16% | -1.62% |
| 2014 | -3.21% | -0.64% | -0.59% | -1.03% | -2.28% | 1.40% | 0.19% | -0.64% | 2.01% | -1.94% | -1.28% | 0.92% |
| 2013 | 4.99% | -0.58% | 6.55% | 6.10% | -1.05% | -0.78% | 0.26% | -0.91% | 1.08% | -0.79% | 1.35% | 1.61% |
| 2012 | -1.43% | 3.77% | 1.31% | -1.26% | -3.88% | 1.72% | 0.79% | 0.89% | 1.28% | 0.54% | 2.53% | 3.78% |
| 2011 | 0.84% | -0.06% | -1.56% | 0.10% | -0.19% | 0.38% | -0.01% | -3.68% | 0.64% | -0.41% | -2.64% | 1.64% |
| 2010 | 0.65% | -0.25% | 3.27% | 3.16% | -2.71% | -1.27% | 1.12% | -0.39% | 0.82% | 1.03% | 1.28% | 1.75% |
| 2009 | 0.35% | 1.62% | -0.76% | -0.71% | 0.98% | 1.03% | -1.84% | 2.07% | -1.61% | -0.40% | -3.37% | 3.19% |
| Class B EUR | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2016 | 1.27% | 0.92% | 1.18% | -0.19% | -1.06% | -4.33% | 2.12% | -1.05% | -0.29% | 2.38% | 0.88% | |
| 2015 | -1.24% | 4.89% | -0.27% | 3.25% | 2.57% | -1.67% | -2.94% | -3.01% | 2.46% | 1.88% | 2.06% | -1.42% |
| 2014 | -3.16% | -0.60% | -0.56% | -0.99% | -2.24% | 1.44% | 0.23% | -0.60% | 2.06% | -1.89% | -1.24% | 0.96% |
| 2013 | 5.35% | -0.58% | 6.98% | 6.48% | -1.07% | -0.78% | 0.31% | -0.92% | 1.18% | -0.80% | 1.46% | 1.73% |
| 2012 | -1.38% | 3.81% | 1.35% | -1.21% | -3.83% | 1.76% | 0.84% | 0.93% | 1.32% | 0.58% | 2.50% | 4.06% |

0.42%

-1.31%

1.13%

0.03%

1.23%

-1.93%

0.96%

-3.63%

-0.37%

2.24%

-1.35%

0.69%

0.91%

-1.68%

1.40%

-0.38%

1.13%

-0.39%

3.44%

-2.60%

1.40%

-2.99%

0.52%

1.68% 1.89%

2.84%

1.39%

2010

0.93%

0.73%

2.07%

-0.03%

-0.23%

1.67%

-1.55%

3.52%

-0.73%

0.14%

3.39%

-0.67%

2009 2008

2011

| Historic Fund Performance (Yearly) | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
| Class A EUR | 1.40% | 5.81% | -6.99% | 18.86% | 10.24% | -4.96% | 8.66% | 0.36% | |
| Class B EUR | 1.68% | 6.36% | -6.52% | 20.57% | 10.95% | -4.48% | 9.67% | 2.75% | 6.46% |

-0.14%

-2.83%

1.34%

| Fund Facts | | Fund Facts | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|
| Investment Manager | Pelargos Capital | Fund Size in EUR | € 93,222,532 |
| Legal Status | FGR (fund for joint account) | Fund Size in USD | \$98,713,339 |
| Fiscal Status | VBI (tax exempt) | Participations Outstanding Class A | 236 |
| Dividend Policy | Reinvestment | Participations Outstanding Class B | 59,945 |
| Base Currency | EUR | Minimum Subscription Class A | EUR 10,000 |
| ISIN Class A EUR | NL0009051887 | Minimum Subscription Class B | EUR 10,000 |
| ISIN Class B EUR | NL0001118015 | Dealing Day | First business day of each month |
| Inception Date Class A EUR | January 2009 | Subscription | Any dealing day, 5 business days notice |
| Inception Date Class B EUR | July 2008 | Redemption | 15 business days notice |
| | | Management Fee Class A | 1.5% |
| Company Facts | | Management Fee Class B | 1.0% |
| Firm AUM in EUR | € 220,303,591 | Performance Fee Class A | 20% subject to High Watermark |
| Firm AUM in USD | \$233,279,473 | Performance Fee Class B | 15% subject to High Watermark |
| | | Early Redemption Fee | max 1% (accrues to Fund) |
| | | Lock-up Class B | 1 year |
| Portfolio Managers | | Service Providers | |
| Richard Dingemans | | Prime Brokers | UBS AG, Goldman Sachs International |
| Michael Kretschmer | | Administrator | BNY Mellon Fund Services |
| | | Accountant | PricewaterhouseCoopers |
| Fund Description | | Legal | De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek N.V. |
| Investment Strategy | Equity Long/Short | Title Holder | SGG Netherlands N.V. |
| | | | |



Investment Style

Contact Details

WTC The Hague, Tower E 7th floor Prinses Margrietplantsoen 43 2595 AM, The Hague The Netherlands +31 (70) 7568030 www.pelargoscapital.com

Investment Objective

Value with a twist Capital appreciation through investing in long/short positions in Japanese securities Depositary

Bank of New York Mellon

Disclaimer

Pelargos Capital B.V. has compiled this publication. Pelargos Capital B.V. is a management company and in that capacity avails of a license pursuant to section 2:65 of the Act on Financial Supervision of the Netherlands (Wft) as that section reads following the incorporation of the AIFM Directive in the Wftl.

Although the information contained in this publication is composed with great care and although we always strive to ensure the accuracy, completeness and correctness of the information, imperfections due to human errors may occur, as a result of which presented data and calculations may vary. Therefore, no rights may be derived from the provided data and calculations. All information is provided "as is" and is subject to change without prior notice.

Pelargos Capital B.V. does not warrant the adequacy, accuracy or completeness of any information and expressly disclaims any liability for errors or omissions therein. The recipients of this publication are responsible for evaluating the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of this information.

The information contained in this publication does not constitute any recommendation, investment proposal, offer to provide a service, nor a solicitation to buy or sell any security or other investment product.

The publication of this information may be subject to restrictions imposed by law in some jurisdictions. Pelargos Capital B.V. requests any recipient of this publication to become acquainted with, and to observe, all restrictions. Pelargos Capital B.V. accepts no liability for infringement of such restrictions.

The recipient shall not distribute, forward or publish this information. No rights may be derived from the provided information, data and calculations. Also by risks inherent to this investment fund, the value of the investments may fluctuate. Past performance is no guarantee or guide to future performance.

