

## MARKET COMMENTS

October was an extremely tough month. It was the worst 1month return for global equities in 9 years. The MSCI Japan collapsed -9%. Intra-month volatility was even higher with a peak-to-trough drop in this benchmark of -13%. The US dollar rapidly appreciated against most Asian currencies and aggravated an already tight US dollar liquidity situation. US dollar strength is a major headwind for Asian risk assets, whilst under 'normal' circumstances a strong US dollar is a tailwind for Japanese equities. However, with the US Fed's tightening cycle progressing 'a small step at the time', last month was a clear indication that its policy reached a point at which US dollars shortage started to impact risk assets globally.

Against this backdrop, the global economy is slowing and the prevailing narrative is one that the US economy is most resilient and therefore the US stock market a preferred investment destination for global investors. Foreign investors aggressively sold their Japanese equity holdings during 2018. Foreign investors now sold almost all their equity allocation which they had acquired during the 2012-2013 'Abenomics trade'. Japanese equities are now as under-owned by global investors as they were in 2008/2009. We have reached again a low point in sentiment, Japanese equities are again disliked, ignored and extremely inexpensive. That said, earnings are solid, but earnings growth is decelerating and cash continues to accumulate on Japan's corporate balance sheets. It is now confirmed that the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of 2018 will have the highest level of share buy-backs ever. The BOJ is buying, the corporates are buying and foreigners have been selling. Our fund lost -3.69% last month, a significant loss and rather disappointing, because we were defensively positioned to begin with. As it happens time and again, during sharp sell-offs, correlations increase and even the most defensive stocks come under pressure.

## SINGLE STOCK OBSERVATIONS

October was a strange month as we noted a blatant disconnect between fundamentals and intrinsic value of the underlying business. More than ever, investors engaged in 'get-me-out' mentality and sold irrespectively of what the business is worth. Some of our sizeable holdings such as Taihei Dengyo (-11.5%), Okamoto Ind. (-18%), Maeda Corp. (-15%) and Maeda Road (-11%) were big losers. These are reasonably stable businesses and these companies have fortress like balance sheets and are trading at stupidly cheap levels. The long book declined -7.6%, it was actually defensively positioned and nicely outperformed the market. However, the short book declined by just the same amount and thereby no alpha was gained and the net exposure of about, on average, 30% took a hit. The top five contributors last month were all short positions, which seems obvious in a market like this. We were delighted that our largest long position, Toshiba Plant Systems (TPS), delivered again great results and its business is very solid. We are less content with the fact that these great earnings are retained within the company rather than returned its shareholder and putting downward pressure on future Return-On-Equity. TPS holds JPY100bn (\$880m) of cash versus a current market capitalization of JPY240bn (\$2.1bn).

# **RISK ALLOCATION**

The net exposure at end of the month stood at +37%, of which 20% are high yielding, low beta REITS (1hotel, 2 solar, 2 office REITS). Another way to look at the net and gross exposure is by sector allocation. The sector with the highest net exposure is Industrials with +22%, followed by Real Estate +18%. These are the two market segments where we currently find the greatest mispricing and potential for valuation gains. We kept the gross exposure at close to 160%, which is above average.

# STYLE ANALYSIS

We track factor returns on a daily basis using our proprietary quant model and observed a strong rally in the value stocks in the last week of the month. Value as a style has had a disastrous performance so far this year and in midst of the global turmoil it seems cheap stocks started to outperform. Price momentum had a poor month, it seems that the bargain hunting season into year-end has already started late October. We noted that hedge funds globally had very poor returns, especially quants. Over the past few years, quant participation has drastically increased in the Japanese market and although it is impossible to assess what it means for stock picking we noticed a steady increase in short selling activity and a higher short selling participation in small/mid cap stocks.

# OUTLOOK

After such a brutal month, it is always good to take a step back and look at the bigger picture. The global economic cycle has been decelerating this year and with the most important central bank withdrawing liquidity, volatility finally returned. We still expect Japanese equities to do well in the coming year, because the underlying structural improvements will lead to higher Return-On-Invested-Capital and valuations are cheap. However, earnings volatility has and will increase and so will price volatility. We aim to use volatility to our advantage and buy more of what we like most, but it is always easier to identify when something is cheap rather than predicting when market participants recognize this and have prices appreciate. We pay special attention to companies that see recent stock price as an opportunity to buy back stock, because management believes in the company strengths and stock undervaluation.



### PELARGOS JAPAN ALPHA FUND

OCTOBER 2018 | monthly return -3.69%

# FUND CHARTS AND FACTS



#### TOP 5 GROSS POSITIONS

Toshiba Plant Sy
Ichigo Hotel REIT Investment C
Ichigo REIT
Alpine Elec
Taihei Dengyo

### TOP 5 MOVERS

Sharp Corp	0.34%
Pepper Food Serv	0.32%
Ube Industries	0.22%
Shinoken Group	0.19%
Alps Elec	0.19%

#### TOP 5 SHAKERS

Taihei Dengyo	-0.58%
Okamoto Inds	-0.57%
Maeda Corp	-0.48%
Maeda Road Const	-0.42%
Ichigo Hotel REIT Investment C	-0.40%

#### FUND FACTOR

	Long	Short
Price to Earnings (PE)	14.8	18.1
EV/EBITDA	11.0	13.9
Price to Book (PB)	1.4	2.6
Dividend Yield	2.5	1.8
EV/IC	1.1	2.5
1 month momentum	-6.6	-10.5
12-1 month momentum	13.0	0.5
Dividend Yield EV/IC 1 month momentum	1.1 -6.6	2.5 -10.5

#### FUND PERFORMANCE\*

Month to date performance	-3.69%
Year to date performance	-9.59%
Inception to date performance	45.18%
*based on share class B EUR	

#### FUND FACTS\*

Fund size in mln EUR	94.95
Fund size in mln USD	107.58
Firm size in mln EUR	223.80
Firm size in mln USD	253.58

### RISK STATISTICS

Net Exposure	37%
Gross Exposure	157%
Volatility (ex-ante; 3 months daily data)	5.5%
Beta (ex-ante)	0.29
Sharpe Ratio	0.54
Sortino Ratio	0.99
Sterling Ratio	0.44
Max Drawdown (monthly)	-8.4%
Annualized Return	3.7%

# SECTOR EXPOSURES (IN PERCENT)

	Long	Shor	Net	Gros
Consumer Discretionary	10	-9	0	19
Consumer Staples	4	-10	-б	15
Energy	0	0	0	0
Financials	3	-2	2	5
Health Care	1	0	0	1
Industrials	38	-16	22	53
Information Technology	7	-6	1	14
Materials	5	-1	З	6
Real Estate	26	-7	18	33
Telecommunication Services	0	0	0	0

5

### GENERAL STATISTICS

% Return long book	-7.61%
% Return short book	-7.60%
# Long stocks	53
# Short stocks	21
% Long stocks ↑	15%
% Short stocks ↓	8196
# Up days / Down days	6/16
Turnover as % NAV	73%





<b></b> ⊈	Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	YTD	ITD
EU	2018	-0.26%	-1.77%	-1.03%	-0.63%	-0.06%	-0.36%	-0.87%	-1.66%	0.36%	-3.69%				45.18%
8 B	2017	0.56%	-0.92%	-1.63%	-0.57%	0.23%	1.32%	1.18%	0.46%	0.99%	1.25%	0.20%	0.14%	3.22%	60.59%
≤	2016	1.27%	0.92%	1.18%	-0.16%	-1.08%	-4.33%	2.12%	-1.05%	-0.29%	2.38%	0.88%	0.39%		55.58%
с ш	2015	-1.24%	4.89%	-0.27%	3.25%	2.57%	-1.67%	-2.94%	-3.01%	2.46%	1.88%	2.06%	-1.42%	6.36%	52.42%
Ū N	2014	-3.16%	-0.60%	-0.56%	-0.99%	-2.24%	1.44%	0.23%	-0.60%	2.06%	-1.89%	-1.24%	0.96%		43.31%
<b>M</b> A	2013	5.35%	-0.58%	6.98%	6.48%	-1.07%	-0.78%	0.31%	-0.92%	1.18%	-0.80%	1.46%	1.73%	20.57%	53.31%
No.	2012	-1.38%	3.81%	1.35%	-1.21%	-3.83%	1.76%	0.84%	0.93%	1.32%	0.58%	2.50%	4.06%		27.15%
ERF	2011	0.93%	-0.03%	-1.55%	0.14%	-0.14%	0.42%	0.03%	-3.63%	0.69%	-0.38%	-2.60%	1.68%	-4.48%	14.60%
ā	2010	0.73%	-0.23%	3.52%	3.39%	-2.83%	-1.31%	1.23%	-0.37%	0.91%	1.13%	1.40%	1.89%		19.97%
ž	2009	2.07%	1.67%	-0.73%	-0.67%	1.34%	1.13%	-1.93%	2.24%	-1.68%	-0.39%	-2.99%	2.84%	2.75%	9.39%
Ξ.	2008							0.96%	-1.35%	1.40%	3.44%	0.52%	1.39%		6.46%



### DISCLAIMER

Pelargos Capital B.V. has compiled this publication. Pelargos Capital B.V. is a management company and in that capacity avails of a license pursuant to section 2:65 of the Act on Financial Supervision of the Netherlands (Wft) as that section reads following the incorporation of the AIFM Directive in the Wft.

Although the information contained in this publication is composed with great care and although we always strive to ensure the accuracy, completeness and correctness of the information, imperfections due to human errors may occur, as a result of which presented data and calculations may vary. Therefore, no rights may be derived from the provided data and calculations. All information is provided "as is" and is subject to change without prior notice.

Pelargos Capital B.V. does not warrant the adequacy, accuracy or completeness of any information and expressly disclaims any liability for errors or omissions therein. The recipients of this publication are responsible for evaluating the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of this information.

The information contained in this publication does not constitute any recommendation, investment proposal, offer to provide a service, nor a solicitation to buy or sell any security or other investment product.

The publication of this information may be subject to restrictions imposed by law in some jurisdictions. Pelargos Capital B.V. requests any recipient of this publication to become acquainted with, and to observe, all restrictions. Pelargos Capital B.V. accepts no liability for infringement of such restrictions.

The recipient shall not distribute, forward or publish this information. No rights may be derived from the provided information, data and calculations. Also by risks inherent to this investment fund, the value of the investments may fluctuate. Past performance is no guarantee or guide to future performance.

